Part of Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36 (NeurIPS 2023) Main Conference Track

*Chanwoo Park, Kaiqing Zhang, Asuman Ozdaglar*

We study a new class of Markov games, \textit{(multi-player) zero-sum Markov Games} with {\it Networked separable interactions} (zero-sum NMGs), to model the local interaction structure in non-cooperative multi-agent sequential decision-making. We define a zero-sum NMG as a model where {the payoffs of the auxiliary games associated with each state are zero-sum and} have some separable (i.e., polymatrix) structure across the neighbors over some interaction network. We first identify the necessary and sufficient conditions under which an MG can be presented as a zero-sum NMG, and show that the set of Markov coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) collapses to the set of Markov Nash equilibrium (NE) in these games, in that the {product of} per-state marginalization of the former for all players yields the latter. Furthermore, we show that finding approximate Markov \emph{stationary} CCE in infinite-horizon discounted zero-sum NMGs is \texttt{PPAD}-hard, unless the underlying network has a ``star topology''. Then, we propose fictitious-play-type dynamics, the classical learning dynamics in normal-form games, for zero-sum NMGs, and establish convergence guarantees to Markov stationary NE under a star-shaped network structure. Finally, in light of the hardness result, we focus on computing a Markov \emph{non-stationary} NE and provide finite-iteration guarantees for a series of value-iteration-based algorithms. We also provide numerical experiments to corroborate our theoretical results.

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